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L Introduction
At 12:01 a.m. this morning, a major thrust of our war on
terrorism began with the stroke of a pen. Today, we have
launched a strike on the financial foundation of the global
terror network .... Just to show you how insidious these
terrorists are, they oftentimes use nice-sounding non-
governmental organizations asfrontsfor their activities ....
If you do business with terrorists, if you support or sponsor
them, you will not do business with the United States of
America. 1
With that, on September 23, 2001, President Bush signed into law
Executive Order 13,224,2 giving the Treasury Department's Office of
Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") broad authority to designate individuals
and organizations as "Specially Designated Global Terrorists" ("SDGTs").
Along with the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
("USA PATRIOT Act")3 and the International Economic Emergency Powers
Act ("IEEPA"), 4 OFAC now has vast power and discretion to not only
designate individuals as terrorists or terrorist supporters, but also to block the
assets of any designated individual or organization pending investigation.
So began the Bush Administration's campaign to fight terrorism through the
destruction of terrorists' financial networks.
Unfortunately, this "strike" at the "foundation" of the global terrorist
financial network has produced meager results, and has done so through an
President George W. Bush, quoted in Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United
Kingdom and United States, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 303,378 (2006).
2 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
3 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 155 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, & 50 U.S.C.).
4 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2000).
5 Id.
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unconstitutional procedure of blocking private assets without providing any
Fourth Amendment safeguards against unreasonable seizures. Very little
funding to al-Qaeda comes from the United States.6 To be sure, what
financing does come from the United States must be stopped, but the point is
that the Bush Administration has repeatedly hyped "successes" in its "War on
Terror" either where they do not exist or where they have come about
through unconstitutional means.
OFAC's power to block assets during the pendency of an
investigation is one example of such a quasi-success, sloppily and
incompetently attained. Blocking orders under the IEEPA are essentially
"freezes": a way to control targeted property. Title to the blocked property
remains with the target, but the exercise of powers and privileges normally
associated with ownership is prohibited without authorization from OFAC.
Blocking immediately imposes an across-the-board prohibition against
transfers or dealings of any kind with regard to the property. 7  After 9/11,
the Bush Administration set high goals for OFAC, seeking one major
designation of a terrorist group per month and smaller designations
consistently.8 The result at OFAC was "chaos."9 Aside from the institutional
incompetence of OFAC to cope with its new responsibilities, 10 Treasury
officials themselves "acknowledged that some of the evidentiary foundations
for the early designations were quite weak."'1
Islamic charities have been one of the prime targets of OFAC
blocking orders. The Financial Action Task Force, a thirty-three-member
group consisting of countries and organizations, concluded that after 9/11,
charities are "particularly vulnerable" to terrorist groups using them for
6 See JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG & SERENA WtLLE, NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING, STAFF REPORT TO THE COMM'N 4,
24 (2004) [hereinafter MONOGRAPH] ("The United States is not, and has not been, a substantial source of
al Qaeda funding, although some funds raised in the United States may have made their way to al Qaeda
and its affiliated groups.").
7 United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtml#l (last visited May 7,
2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
8 See MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 79 ("The goal set at the policy levels of the White House
and Treasury was to conduct a public and aggressive series of designations to show the world community
and our allies that the United States was serious about pursuing the fiancial targets. It entailed a major
designation every four weeks, accompanied by derivative designations throughout the month.").
9 id. ("The post-9/11 period at OFAC was 'chaos."').
10 See David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359,
1381-83 (2007) (arguing that OFAC has been inexpert at designating entities as terrorists since 9/11).
I MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 79.
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money-laundering purposes.' 2  At least six Islamic charities have been
suspected of being conduits for terrorist financing schemes, and have had
their assets blocked pending an OFAC investigation into possible criminal
support for terrorist financing.m3 These organizations have all been destroyed
by the blocking orders, yet none of the organizations have been convicted.
4
The focus of this Note is not on the ultimate guilt or innocence of the
organizations in question; rather, it is on the procedures used to obtain
needed results. This Note argues that the blocking actions have had severe
procedural flaws, and therefore have been unconstitutional seizures under the
Fourth Amendment.
This Note first describes the statutory framework that controls
OFAC's asset freezes. 15 Second, this Note presents the cases of the charities
and organizations that have had their assets frozen after 9/11: the
organizations, the investigations into the organizations, the asset freezes
themselves, and the resulting legal challenges and general aftermath.' 6
Third, this Note analyzes Fourth Amendment case law. 17  The Fourth
Amendment analysis begins by analyzing what constitutes a "seizure" under
the Fourth Amendment.' 8 This Note then determines that asset freezes under
the IEEPA constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment, 9 providing a
straightforward constitutional analysis of why asset freezes under the LEEPA
constitute seizures, 20 a comparison to a similar asset freeze in the securities
regulation context,2' and a refutation of various courts' Fourth Amendment
analysis in OFAC asset freezing cases after 9/11.22 Fourth, this Note
analyzes whether the asset freezes, without findings of probable cause or
even reasonable suspicion, nonetheless are "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment. 23  After laying out the constitutional framework, 24 this Note
12 See Victoria B. Bjorklund, Jennifer I. Reynoso & Abbey Hazlett, Terrorism and Money
Laundering: Illegal Purposes and Activities, 25 PACE L. REv. 233, 239-40 (citing FINANCIAL ACrION
TASK FORCE, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ANNUAL REPORT, 2001-2002 (2002)) (discussing FATF's
findings).
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part U.
15 See infra Part I.
16 See infra Part II.
17 See infra Part UlI.
18 See infra Part IMl.A.
19 See infra Part IH.B.
20 See infra Part I.B. 1.
21 See infra Part ll.B.2.
22 See infra Part I.B3.
2 See infra Part II.C.
24 See infra Part 1II.C. 1.
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determines that asset freezes under the IEEPA and by OFAC have thus far
been unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, and suggests what is
required to make the freezes reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.25
II. Statutory Framework
The Executive has long used economic sanctions as a tool of foreign
policy. The modem framework began in 1917, when Congress enacted the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 ("TWEA") 26 on the verge of entering
World War I. The thrust of the TWEA was to prohibit certain financial
transactions with enemies of the United States during wartime, including
transfers of property. 7 Congress later amended the TWEA to allow the
president to impose economic sanctions during peacetime if the president
28declared a national emergency.
In 1977, Congress passed the IEEPA to replace the TWEA.29 The
IEEPA provides that the president can declare a national emergency "to deal
with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign
policy or economy of the United States."30 Under the IEEPA, the president
can:
Investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation,
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit,
any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer,
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or
dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with
respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by
25 See infra Part 1I.C.2.
26 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-91, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2000)).
27 Id. § 5(b); see also Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of
Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy,
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1356 (2004) (describing the President's powers under the TWEA).
28 Act of March 9, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-1, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1 (1933) (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2000)).
29 International Economic Emergency Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101, 91 Stat. 1625
(1997) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (2004)).
30 Id. at 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
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any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.3'
In October 2001, Congress amended the IEEPA by passing the USA
PATRIOT Act.32  The USA PATRIOT Act, among other things, amended
the IEEPA to authorize the president to block assets "during the pendency of
an investigation.
33
In 1995, President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12,947
pursuant to his authority under the IEEPA.34 That order declared a national
emergency with respect to the Middle East peace process, and designated
Hamas, a Palestinian organization, a "Specially Designated Terrorist"
("SDT"), and blocked its property and interests in property within the
jurisdiction of the United States.35  The order also allowed for further
designations as SDTs as needed in the future; once an organization was
designated, Executive authority under the Act could be exerted against that
organization.36
Shortly after 9/11, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,224
pursuant to his authority under the IEEPA.37 The order declared a national
emergency respecting the "grave acts of terrorism... and the continuing and
immediate threat of further attacks on United States nationals or the United
States. 38 Executive Order 13,224 further authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury to designate organizations and people as "Specially Designated
Global Terrorists" ("SDGT").39 Importantly, once an organization or person
has been designated an SDGT, the Executive Order authorizes the Treasury
Secretary to "employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA,"
including blocking assets pending investigation. 4° Further, the Executive
Order states:
31 Id. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
32 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, & 50 U.S.C.).
33 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
34 Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 5079-80.
37 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 ld. at 49,08 1.
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Because of the ability to transfer funds or assets instantaneously,
prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to
this order would render these measures ineffectual. I therefore
determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the
national emergency declared in this order, there need be no prior
notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to this order.4'
Neither the IEEPA nor the Executive Orders specify what evidence is needed
to issue a blocking order-apparently, it is within OFAC's discretion.
III. The Charity Cases
Since September 11, 2001, OFAC has acted pursuant to the IEEPA
and Executive Order 13,224 to block the assets of six fairly major charities-
Global Relief Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation, Holy Land
Foundation, Islamic American Relief Agency, Al-Haramain Islamic
Foundation, and KindHearts-as well as a major money remittance system
used by Somali immigrants, Al-Barakaat. In each case, no formal legal
determination of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion was found, let
alone a warrant issued. The government has not been able to convict any of
the organizations presented below with a crime; the closest it has come is a
guilty plea by one of Benevolence International Foundation's leaders.42
Regardless, in each case the blocking action destroyed the organization. This
section analyzes the charity cases: the organizations, the investigations, the
blocking actions, the court decisions, and the outcomes.
A. Global Relief Foundation
Global Relief Foundation ("GRF") was an Islamic charity based out of
Bridgeville, Illinois, which began operations in 1992.43 GRF described itself
as an organization whose mission was to do charitable work around the
world for Muslims.44 Some of this alleged charitable work included support
41 Id.
42 See MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 108 (discussing the criminal case).
43 See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 785 (N.D. I. 2002) (stating
that GRF is chartered in Illinois and began operating in 1992).
44 See MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 89 ("GRF described itself as a nongovernmental
organization (NGO) that provided humanitarian relief aid to Muslims through overseas offices around the
world .... ).
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for hospitals and clinics, relief for earthquake and drought victims, and aid to
refugees. 45 Much of GRF's work was focused on providing relief "in strife-
torn regions such as Bosnia, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and
Chechnya."'46 The charity was quite large, claiming to be "the largest U.S.-
based Islamic charitable organization 'with respect to the geographic scope
of its relief programs.' ,47 It began its operations in 1992 with $700,000 cash,
and by 2000 it was receiving $5,000,000 in annual contributions.48
The FBI began investigating GRF's possible ties to terrorist groups
in the mid 1990s, 49 and by 1999 concluded that GRF was a "jihadist
organization" and had ties with al-Qaeda.50  Nevertheless, before 9/11 the
FBI believed that bringing a criminal case against GRF would be impossible:
they had no direct evidence of involvement in terrorist groups, they believed
the United States Attorney's Office did not have the expertise to bring a
terrorism case, and in early 2001 their warrants under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") were not renewed. 5' After 9/11 the
investigation picked up again with a renewal of FISA warrants and the
instatement of Patrick Fitzgerald, who had prior experience regarding
terrorism cases, as the new U.S. Attorney for Chicago.
52
OFAC became involved in December 2001 in order to designate GRF
as an SDGT under the IEEPA.53 Aside from the probable public pressure to
see results in its "war on terror," the CIA believed, dubiously, that GRF
45 See Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justice for the "Designated": The Process that is Due to
Alleged U.S. Financiers of Terrorism, 93 GEo. L.J. 1387, 1400 (2005) (stating that GRF "has supported
clinics, trade schools, and hospitals... [and has] provided aid to victims of earthquakes. . . ,droughts...
and to distressed refugees .... ).
4 MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 89.
47 Global Relief Found., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 785 (quoting Complaint at 12, Global Relief
Found., Inc., v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (No. 02-C-674)).
48 MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 89 ("GRF began operating with $700,000 in cash. By 2000, it
reported more than $5 million in annual contributions.").
49 See id. ("GRF came to the attention of the FBI's Chicago Division in the mid-1990s ... .
50 See id. at 90 ("By late 1999, the Chicago case agents were comfortable in their conclusion that
GRF was a jihadist organization and that its executive director had connections to both AGIA and what
they called the 'Islamic Army organization of international terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin.' They
believed that multiple sources of evidence supported these conclusions.").
51 See id. at 93-94 (noting that the FBI agents in Chicago did not think they could bring a
criminal case because: "[tihey had much smoke but no real fire-they had no direct evidence of serious
criminal activity"; "they did not think that the U.S. Attorney's Office had sufficient expertise in
[international terrorism] cases"; and "in late spring or early summer 2001 ... the FISA warrants were not
extended.").
52 See id. at 98 (stating that FISA warrants were renewed and noting the prior experience of
Patrick Fitzgerald, the new U.S. Attorney).
53 See id. at 99 ("OFAC dispatched two analysts to Chicago in early December 2001 to review
the FBI files and begin putting together the evidentiary packages that would support designations.").
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might be involved in a plot involving weapons of mass destruction.54 The
General Counsel of Treasury, who was coordinating the effort, told OFAC
that it needed to act immediately. 5 Because OFAC did not have enough
evidence to designate GRF as an SDGT under the IEEPA (let alone to
proceed on criminal charges), OFAC used its power under the IEEPA to
freeze GRF's assets pending investigation. 56 "Only a single piece of paper,
signed by the director of OFAC, was required. 5 7  The blocking order
effectively shut down GRF as an organization.58 There were no formal
findings of fact, no judicial determination of any kind, and no finding of
probable cause or even of reasonable suspicion.
In court proceedings, OFAC claimed that "it acted on the basis of
substantial classified and unclassified information related to Global Reliefs
possible connections with terrorist organizations. 59 OFAC appears to have
had some evidence linking GRF to terrorist groups and individuals, even if
such evidence might not have been sufficient to meet probable cause or to
proceed with a criminal case:
OFAC's internal documents supporting the designation spelled out
its ties to al Qaeda leaders, including (1) evidence that GRF provided
$20,000 to a suspected al Qaeda fund-raiser in November 2001; (2)
the phone contacts between GRF's executive director and the
mujahideen leader associated with al Qaeda leadership; (3) the phone
contacts linking GRF to Wadi al Hage, [Osama bin Laden's]
personal secretary, who was convicted in the United States for his
role in the 1998 embassy bombings; and (4) funds that GRF received
from Mohammed Galeb Kalaje Zouaydi, a suspected al Qaeda
financier in Europe who was arrested in Spain in 2002.
54 See id. (stating that the CIA believed GRF might be "involved in a plot to attack the United
States with weapons of mass destruction").
55 See id. ("OFAC received word from the General Counsel of Treasury, who was coordinating
the interagency effort against terrorist financing, that it needed to designate BIF and GRF immediately.").
56 See id. (stating that OFAC had not "developed the evidence necessary for a designation under
IEEPA" and that on December 14, 2001 it used its powers under the IEEPA to freeze GRF's assets).
57 Id. Although, OFAC contends that "in practice, an interagency group discusses and agrees to
any designation." Id. at 102 n.88.
58 See id. ("OFAC announced this action on December 14, 2001, thereby effectively shutting
down [GRF] in the United States while gaining additional time to develop the evidentiary packages
necessary for permanent designations.").
59 Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (N.D. I11. 2002).
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OFAC's unclassified Statement of the Case laid out the extensive
evidence indicating GRF's role in supporting jihad. This evidence
included the pictures of sophisticated communications equipment the
FBI had found in the trash, photographs of jihadists both alive and
dead, and documents establishing GRF's enthusiastic support for
armed jihad. For example, a GRF pamphlet from 1995 stated, "God
equated martyrdom through JIHAD with supplying funds for the
JIHAD effort. All contributions should be mailed to: GRF." Another
GRF publication stated that charitable funds "are disbursed for
equipping the raiders, for the purchase of ammunition and food, and
for [the mujahideen's] transportation so that they can raise God the
Almighty's word[;j . . . it is likely the most important . . .
disbursement of Zakat [a charity requirement of Islam] in our times
is on the jihad for God's cause[.] '"6
In the notice that OFAC issued freezing GRF's assets, however, there was no
mention of how GRF violated the IEEPA and the Executive Order.61
Furthermore, whether this evidence would have amounted to probable cause,
or even reasonable suspicion, will never be known, because OFAC did not-
nor did it need to under the IEEPA-go to a judge for a warrant to freeze
GRF's assets.
GRF denied that they had any links to terrorism, 62 and subsequently
filed suit in federal court to unfreeze its assets and return items seized during
a search of GRF' s office.63 The organization, however, did not argue that the
blocking order was an unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, even though it argued that OFAC's actions were illegal under a
slew of statutory and constitutional claims.64 What is particularly striking is
that GRF argued that the search and seizure of their corporate office and one
of their executive's residence violated the Fourth Amendment, yet failed to
60 MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 106.
61 See Nice-Petersen, supra note 45, at 1400 ("In the government's blocking notice, it stated only
that it had 'reason to believe [GRF] may be engaged in activities that violate [the] [IEEPA]."') (citing
Letter from U.S. Department of the Treasury to Global Relief Foundation, Inc., Blocking Notice and
Requirement to Furnish Information (Dec. 14, 2001)).
62 See MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 100 (stating that the charity "aggressively denied any
connection to terrorism").
63 Global Relief Found., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 786-87 ("Global Relief filed a petition for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief... [and] requested that the defendants be ordered to 'unfreeze'
its assets and return its items seized during the search of the organization's office and the executive
director's residence.").
64 See id. at 787-809 (analyzing GRF's arguments relating to the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Fifth
Amendment, and the First Amendment, among others).
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make the same claim regarding the asset freeze.65 For this Note's purposes,
the government attempted, while addressing a different legal argument,66 to
distinguish "blocking" from "seizing" by arguing that Congress believed
blocking assets were not seizures because seizures were akin to vesting of
title and forfeiture, while blockings were merely freezes.6 7 The government
argued:
[T]he legislative history [of the IEEPA] demonstrates the difference
between "blocking" and "seizing" property; Congress considered a
"seizure" to be equivalent to a "vesting" or "forfeiture" of the
property, with ownership passing to the government, while a
"blocking" merely permitted the agency to hold or "freeze" the
property, but not take title to it. In this case, OFAC has not taken
title to [GRF's] property . . . . For these same reasons, [GRF's]
Fourth Amendment claim against OFAC should be rejected as well.
68
What is interesting about this excerpt is that GRF did not make a Fourth
Amendment claim regarding the freezing of its assets. Perhaps the
government was being sloppy, or perhaps the government was wary about its
authority under the Fourth Amendment to implement the freeze. Regardless,
the court decided against GRF on every single other claim it raised.69
Despite investigating GRF for years, despite evidence from the search
and seizure of GRF's offices and property, and despite having a FISA search
warrant, the government has not brought any criminal charges against GRF
or its executives. 70  The government's case was weak, but the government
was able to shut down GRF anyway through the prolonged asset freeze.
65 See id. at 807 ("Global Relief... argues that defendants unconstitutionally searched its offices
and seized its property in violation of the Fourth Amendment.").
66 The government was addressing whether OFAC had power to freeze GRF's assets under the
Executive Order and IEEPA. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment at 16 n.19,
Global Relief Found., Inc., v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ul1. 2002).
67 See id. (arguing for a difference between blocking and seizing according to legislative history).
68 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
69 See Global Relief Found., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 809 (concluding that GRF was unlikely to
succeed on the merits on any claim and therefore the motion for injunctive relief must fail). GRF raised
an appeal to the Seventh Circuit, but not on Fourth Amendment grounds, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court. See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding the
district court's judgment).
70 See MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 110 ("[T]he government has to date filed no criminal
charges against GRF or its leadership .... ").
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B. Benevolence International Foundation
The story of Benevolence International Foundation ("BIF") is almost
identical. Three Saudis incorporated BIF in Illinois in early 1992. 7' One of
the Saudis, Sheikh Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee, had given money to the
mujahideen, led by bin Laden, in Afghanistan in their fight against the
Soviets.72 Enaam Arnaout took over as executive director from Batterjee in
1993, although the government has alleged that Batterjee continued to play a
role in BIF through communications with Arnaout.7 3 The government
contended that Arnaout was also a supporter of jihad and had ties with bin
Laden.74 According to the memorandum filed in support of the plaintiffs
preliminary injunction, BIF's alleged purpose was to provide "humanitarian
aid in many of the neediest areas of the world, including Afghanistan,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia, China, Daghestan, Injushetia, Pakistan, and
Tajikistan. '75 Part of that aid included support of hospitals in Tajikistan and
Daghestan, and support of "refugees" in Chechnya.76 However the money
was actually spent, BIF received "more than $15 million in donations
between 1995 and 2000.
77
As with GRF, the FBI had trouble investigating BIF before 9/11. As
the 9/11 Commission reported:
78
Overall, [the] BIF investigation was in the same position as the GRF
investigation on 9/11: the agents believed BIF had substantial ties to
al Qaeda, was supporting jihad, and was sending a great deal of
71 See id. at 94 (stating that BIF incorporated in Illinois in March 1992 and was founded by three
Saudis).
72 See id. (maintaining that in 1987 Batterjee founded a group providing support to the
mujahideen fights in Afghanistan as well as aid to the war's refugees, and that bin Laden was one of the
mujahideen's leaders).
73 See id. at 94-95 (asserting that Arnaout took over in 1993 and that Batterjee remained in
contact with Amaout).
74 See id. at 95 (linking Amaout with bin Laden and the jihadist movement).
75 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Benevolence International Foundation's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 4, Benevolence Int'l Found. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. I11. 2002)
(No. 02-C-0763) (contending that it provided relief in the countries listed); see also Benevolence Int'l
Found., 200 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (stating that BIF alleged to provide relief to the named countries).
76 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Benevolence International Foundation's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 5-6, Benevolence Int'l Found. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(No. 02-C-0763) (arguing that BIF had provided aid to hospitals in Tajikistan and Daghestan and that it
had provided relief to Chechen "refugees").
77 MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 95.
78 See id. at 97 (arguing that the FBI was having trouble finding out specifically where BIF's
money was going, despite having information regarding a connection between BIF and terrorist groups).
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money overseas, but they could not trace the money directly to its
ultimate destination overseas. Although they had access to
considerable information, the agents believed they still could not
come close to proving a criminal case against Arnaout or BIF.79
Again, as with GRF, in December 2001 the General Counsel of Treasury
demanded that BIF needed to be designated an SDGT immediately, even
80though OFAC did not have adequate evidence to bring a criminal case.
OFAC therefore froze BIF's assets on December 14, 2001, the same day it
froze GRF's assets.8'
Soon thereafter, BIF brought suit against the government.8 2 Among
various legal arguments, BIEF contended that OFAC's blocking order violated
the Fourth Amendment.83 Specifically, BIF argued that the asset freeze was
a "meaningful interference" with their possessory interests in their property,
and that lacking probable cause, the seizure was presumptively
unconstitutional.84  BIF further argued that the seizure was unreasonable
because "the blocking order forbids BIF to make any use of its property, is of
potentially unlimited duration, [and] has never been approved by any judicial
officer .... ,85
The court, however, never reached this claim because the court stayed
the proceeding pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings against
86Arnaout. As it happened, the FBI had received a break in their case in
March 2002, when a search was conducted in BIF's Bosnian office.87
This search yielded compelling evidence of links between BIF's
leaders, including Arnaout, and Usama Bin Ladin and other al Qaeda
79 Id.
so See id. at 99 (describing the immediate background to OFAC's freeze of BIF's assets).
81 See, e.g., id. (stating that OFAC blocked BIF's assets on that date); Benevolence Int'l Found.
v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935, 936 (N.D. 111 2002) ("On December 14, 2001, the Department of
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control... issued BIF a notice stating that ... Treasury was blocking
all BIF's funds, accounts and business records pending further investigation, pursuant to IEEPA.").
82 See Benevolence Int'l Found., 200 F. Supp. 2d at 935 (bringing an action against the
government for violating its constitutional rights in searching its property and blocking its funds).
83 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Benevolence International Foundation's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 43, Benevolence Int'l Found. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. 111. 2002)
(No. 02-C-0763) (arguing that the blocking of BIF's property constitutes an illegal seizure).
84 See id. (claiming that the blocking of BIF's property was an unconstitutional seizure).
85 Id. at 44.
86 See Benevolence Int'l Found., 200 F. Supp. 2d at 941 (staying the civil proceeding until the
conclusion of the criminal proceeding).
87 See MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 102 (describing the search in Bosnia).
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leaders, going back to the 1980s. The material seized included many
documents never before seen by U.S. officials, such as the actual
minutes of al Qaeda meetings, the al Qaeda oath, al Qaeda
organizational charts, and the "Golden Chain" list of wealthy donors
to the Afghan mujahideen, as well as letters between Arnaout and
Bin Ladin, dating to the late 1980s.
88
The government soon indicted Arnaout, who subsequently pled guilty to a
racketeering charge related to support for Chechen "rebels.""9 Although the
government did not have enough evidence to try a criminal case against BIF
itself, OFAC nonetheless designated BIF an SDGT on November 19, 2002,
and the United Nations followed suit shortly thereafter, listing BIF as
affiliated with al-Qaeda.90 Specifically, OFAC supported its designation
with the following unclassified evidence:
OFAC drew links between BIF and Bin Ladin by noting (1) in 1998,
BIF provided direct logistical support for an al Qaeda member and
Bin Ladin lieutenant, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, to travel to Bosnia-
Herzegovina; (2) telephone records linked BIF to Mohammed Loay
Bayazid, who had been implicated in al Qaeda's effort to obtain
enriched uranium; (3) in the early 1990s, BIF produced videotapes
that eulogized dead fighters, including two al Qaeda members; and
(4) in the late 1990s, a member of al Qaeda's Shura Council served
as an officer in BIF's Chechnya office. OFAC cited a number of
ways in which BIF's activities differed from its ostensible purpose
(e.g., it altered its books to make support for an injured Bosnian
fighter appear as aid to an orphan), the purchase of equipment for
Chechen fighters, and the newspaper article the FBI agents had found
in the trash, in which someone had highlighted the weaknesses in the
U.S. defenses against bioterrorism.
91
While there was a lot of evidence suggesting BIF's ties to terrorist groups,
little evidence actually tied BIF's funds to support for terrorism or to the
commission of any recognized crime. BIF was shut down anyway.
88 Id. at 102-03.
89 See id. at 108 (discussing the criminal case).
90 See id. at 105 (discussing OFAC's designation of BIF).
91 Id. at 106.
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C. Holy Land Foundation
Holy Land Foundation For Global Relief and Development ("HLF")
was founded in 1989 in Texas as a 501(c)(3) charitable organization,
providing charitable services in the West Bank, Gaza, Bosnia, Chechnya and
elsewhere.92 HLF had a large operating budget of around $12 million per
year, and, according to one activist in the Muslim-American community,
"[t]o the average Muslim living in the US, HLF was a trusted name.
93
The controversy with HLF centered on its connection, if any, to
Hamas.94 Both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush designated
Hamas a terrorist organization under the IEEPA.95 As the district court
summarized, the administrative record developed by the government
included evidence that:
(1) HLF has had financial connections to Hamas since its creation in
1989;96 (2) HLF leaders have been actively involved in various
meetings with Hamas leaders; 97 (3) HLF funds Hamas-controlled
charitable organizations;98 (4) HLF provides financial support to the
92 Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) provides an exemption from federal income tax for
non-profit organizations operated, for example, solely for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2008). See, e.g., Nice-Peterson, supra
note 45 at 1396-97 (explaining the background of HLF); Laila Al-Marayati, American Muslim Charities:
Easy Targets in the War on Terror, 25 PACE L. REV. 321, 324 (2005) (discussing the case against HLF).
93 AI-Marayati, supra note 92, at 324.
94 See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002)
(discussing HLF's alleged ties to Hamas); Al-Marayati, supra note 92, at 325 ("The case around HLF is
mainly built around allegations related to financing charitable works that had supposed links to members
of Hamas."). It must also be noted that HLF did not dispute that Hamas is a terrorist organization in court.
See id. at 64 n.2 ("The parties do not dispute that Hamas is a terrorist organization.").
95 See Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (stating that Hamas was designated a "specially
designated terrorist" under Executive Order 12,947 by President Clinton in January 1995); see also
Frederick Block, Civil Liberties During National Emergencies: The Interactions Between the Three
Branches of Government in Coping with Past and Current Threats to the Nation's Security, 29 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 459, 494 (2005) (commenting on the HLF case).
96 See Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 69-70 (specifying evidence that HLF fundraised for
Hamas, evidence that Hamas leaders gave HLF $210,000 (which was noted on HLF's tax return), and
evidence that HLF paid for Hamas leaders' visits to the United States in the early 1990s).
97 See id. at 70 (detailing evidence of two meetings between "five senior Hamas officials and
three senior HLF leaders" in the early 1990s).
98 See id. at 70-71 (specifying evidence that HLF gave over $1 million to Hamas-controlled
zakat committees) In a footnote, the district court noted:
The record contains evidence that the political, as opposed to military, activities of
Hamas include a broad network of charitable organizations including zakat
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orphans and families of Hamas martyrs and prisoners;" (5) HLF's
Jerusalem office acted on behalf of Hamas;'0° and (6) FBI informants
reliably reported that HLF funds Hamas.'
0 1
Based on this evidence, OFAC, on December 4, 2001, designated HLF an
SDGT and issued a blocking order of HLF's assets.
0 2
Shortly thereafter, HLF challenged its designation and the blocking of
its assets in court, bringing various statutory and constitutional claims.
10 3
Included in those claims was a Fourth Amendment claim arguing that the
government had violated HLF's Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable seizures by blocking HLF's assets.' °4  The government
contended that the freezing of assets did not constitute a seizure.10 5 In
summarily dismissing HLF's Fourth Amendment claim regarding the freeze,
the court stated that case law was clear that "blocking of this nature does not
constitute a seizure."' 0 6  The court cited one circuit court opinion and four
district court opinions for the proposition that freezing assets under the
IEEPA does not constitute a seizure. 0 7 The court first cited Tran Qui Than
v. Regan,10 8 a Ninth Circuit opinion which held that blocking orders under
the TWEA do not constitute takings under the Fifth Amendment because the
blocking is temporary and title does not vest in the government.' °9 Second,
committees, hospitals, schools, and institutions .... [l]t is not always possible to
distinguish the "innocent" activity of the charity associations and the funding of
covert, subversive and terrorist activity. To that end, both President Bush and
President Clinton have designated all of Hamas as a terrorist organization, and
determined that even charitable contributions to Hamas impair the ability to deal
with the national emergency.
Id. at 71 n.20 (citations and quotations omitted).
99 See id. at 71-72 (describing evidence, obtained by the Israeli government, of orphan
sponsorship forms in which "in nearly every case, the applicant's parent or guardian was either jailed by
the Israeli government for security reasons or martyred"). HLF disputed the meaning of the term
"martyr," arguing that it had a broad meaning of anyone who has died in "Palestine" other than by natural
causes. See id. at 72 (noting HLF's interpretation of "martyr").
'00 See Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (specifying evidence that the Israeli government
shut down HLFs Jerusalem office in 1995 because it was allegedly supporting and funneling money to
families of Hamas members).
101 See id. at 69, 73 (establishing evidence of eight unidentified FBI informants).
102 See, e.g., id. at 62 (noting the factual background of the case).
103 See id. at 62-85 (analyzing HLF's various claims).
104 See id. at 78-80 (discussing Fourth Amendment claim).
1'5 Id. at 78.
'6 Id. at 79.
107 See id. (discussing Fourth Amendment claim).
108 Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1981).
109 See id. at 1304 (concluding that the Fifth Amendment is not violated).
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the court cited a footnote in D.C. Precision, Inc. v. United States i° for the
rule that assets blocked under the IEEPA do not constitute takings under the
Fifth Amendment because the assets are not "seized or appropriated by the
government," but are only "temporarily" blocked."' Third, the court cited
Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empleados de Distribuidores de Drogas v.
Newcomb'1 2 for the proposition that blockings do not constitute forfeitures. 3
Fourth, the court cited IPT Co. v. United States Department of Treasury,' 
14
which held, on the facts of the specific case, that the freezing of assets under
the IEEPA did not constitute an unconstitutional taking."15 Finally, the court
cited Can v. United States," 6 which found that under the TWEA blocking
does not constitute a vesting, and as such does not constitute a seizure or
taking." 7 The court's analysis mimicked almost jot for jot the government's
argument in Global Relief Foundation concerning the interpretation of the
IEEPA regarding the Fourth Amendment.'"
8
HLF appealed to the circuit court, but the circuit court affirmed on
other grounds.' '9 In 2004, the government finally charged HLF and some of
its executives with terrorism-related charges.12 0  In October 2007, however,
110 D.C. Precision, Inc. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
I Id. at 343 n.1.
112 Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empleados de Distribuidores de Drogas v. Newcomb, No. 98-
0949, slip op. at 23-24 (D.D.C. Mar 29, 1999).
13 See Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 79 (D.D.C. 2002)
(discussing the Fourth Amendment claim).
"14 IPT Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, No. 92 Civ. 5542, 1994 WL 613371, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
4, 1994).
115 See id. at *5 ("[T]he Court finds this application of the blocking order to plaintiff is not a
taking at this time.") (emphasis added).
116 Can v. United States, 820 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
17 See id. at 109 ("The assets at issue here have never been seized, although the blocking order
has remained in effect for eighteen years. 'The blocking of the assets,' however, 'does not affect the
interest, right or title to them which [plaintiffs] may possess.' Although 'blocking involves a deprivation
of the enjoyment of a property interest . . . , [t]hat deprivation is temporary ... and is not equivalent to
vesting.') (citations omitted).
18 See supra note 66 for the government's analysis.
19 See Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(affirming the district court's decision).
120 See, e.g., Nice-Petersen, supra note 45, at 1400 (stating that the government criminally
charged HLF and seven of its officials); United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 445 F.3d
771, 777 (5th Cir. 2006) (summarizing the factual history of the case). Additionally, the parents of a
United States teenager, who was killed by Hamas at a bus stop in the West Bank, won a $156 million
verdict against HLF for its role in funding Hamas. See Hamas Victim's Family Get $156M, BBC,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/middleeast/4080499.stm (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (discussing court
verdict).
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the trial ended in a mistrial for some charges and in acquittals for other
charges.1
2 1
D. Islamic American Relief Agency
The Islamic American Relief Agency ("IARA-USA") was created as
the Islamic African Relief Agency in 1985 in Columbia, Missouri. 22 The
organization "provided charitable and humanitarian aid to refugees, orphans,
victims of human and natural disasters, and other poor and needy persons
and entities through the world," 1
23 concentrating its efforts on Africa.1
24
The focus of controversy stems from LARA-USA's possible ties to
terrorist organizations located in Sudan.125  The founder of the Islamic
African Relief Agency, Mohammed El-Bashir, emigrated from Sudan in the
1980s.126  At the time El-Bashir founded his organization in the United
States, there already existed an organization called Islamic African Relief
Agency (LARA) in Sudan.127  While IARA-USA maintained that the two
organizations were entirely separate and distinct, 128  the government
presented evidence that IARA-USA considered itself a subsidiary branch of
the Sudan-based IARA.1 29 Accordingly, OFAC designated IARA, including
JARA-USA, an SDGT on October 13, 2004, and blocked the assets of
121 See, e.g., Leslie Eaton, U.S. Prosecution of Muslim Group Ends in Mistrial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 2007, at Al (relating the result of the trial against Holy Land Foundation and its leading officers);
Peter Whoriskey, Mistrial Declared In Islamic Charity Case: Jurors Find No Proof That Donations
Indirectly Aided Militant Hamas, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2007, at A3 (same).
122 See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39-40
(D.D.C. 2005) (giving the factual background of the charity). The organization later changed its name to
the Islamic American Relief Agency. See id. (discussing the facts of the case).
123 Id. at 40.
124 See Appellant's Final Brief on Appeal at 4, Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzalez, 477 F.3d
728 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 05-5447) (listing countries to which it provided support to).
"2 See, e.g., Brief for the Appellees, at 6-9, Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzalez, 477 F.3d
728 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 05-5447) (arguing that JARA had ties with a Sudanese terrorist organization).
126 See Appellant's Final Brief on Appeal, supra note 124, at 4 ("Plaintiffs original founding
member, Mohammed EI-Bashir, came to America from Sudan in the early 80's.").
127 See Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (discussing the factual background of the
case).
128 See Appellant's Final Brief on Appeal, supra note 124, at 4-6 (noting that LARA had its own
board of directors and officers and that its tax statements made no reference to the Sudanese
organization).
129 See Brief for the Appellees, supra note 125, at 6-9 (arguing that TARA consistently referred to
itself as the Sudanese organization's "United States Affiliate" and that Sudanese organization identified
LARA "as its affiliate in the United States").
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IARA-USA and five of its officials. 130  It appears that most of the
government's evidence linking IARA to terrorism was labeled classified.131
IARA-USA challenged its designation and blocking order in court.
32
Among other claims, it raised a Fourth Amendment challenge to the
government's blocking order.133 IARA-USA cited two cases for its Fourth
Amendment argument. 34  First, in United States v Daccarett,35 the court
held that, in a civil forfeiture case where the assets in question were first
frozen and then transferred to the clerk of court for in rem jurisdiction,
probable cause was needed to lawfully effect the seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. 36  Second, in United States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology
Associates, 37 the court argued that a freezing of assets pending further order,
in order to satisfy a judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
64, was similar enough to seizure by attachment to warrant being called a
seizure, and therefore protected by the Fourth Amendment. 1
38
The government made two arguments. 139 First, the government argued
that the court in Holy Land Foundation already correctly upheld the
government's actions against the Fourth Amendment in identical
circumstances.140  Second, the government argued that freezing of assets
implicated the President's authority in foreign policy and national security,
and thus was entitled to great deference. 141  Specifically, the government
argued that the blocking order was not subject to the warrant requirement
because warrants are not generally needed when the President exercises his
foreign affairs powers. 142  The government then contended that, absent a
130 See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40 (D.D.C.
2005) (giving the factual background of the case).
131 See Appellant's Final Brief on Appeal, supra note 124, at 10-14 (deleting those pages as
classified).
132 See Islamic Am. ReliefAgency, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 44 (analyzing IARA-USA's claims).
133 See id. at 47-48 (analyzing the Fourth Amendment claim).
134 See Plaintiffs Answer to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment at 47,
Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 04-2264)
(listing two cases to support its Fourth Amendment claim).
135 United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993).
136 See id. at 49-50 (concluding Fourth Amendment requirements are present).
137 United States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Associates, 198 F.3d 489 (4th Cir. 1999).
138 See id. at 500 (analyzing plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim).
139 See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment at 38-39, Islamic Am. Relief
Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 04-2264) (arguing that the
Fourth Amendment is satisfied).
140 See id. at 39 (discussing Holy Land Foundation).
141 See id. at 39-46 (analyzing the blocking order's Fourth Amendment implications).
142 See id. at 42 (detailing the warrant requirement in the context of the national security).
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warrant requirement, the Fourth Amendment only required that a
reasonableness standard be satisfied, and, given the paramount and
compelling importance of national security, the temporary blocking orders
were reasonable and therefore constitutional.
143
The court ruled in favor of the government, disposing of the Fourth
Amendment argument in a single paragraph that appears to have been based
exclusively on Holy Land Foundation's analysis. 44 IARA-USA later
appealed the case, but the circuit court affirmed on unrelated grounds.
145
E. Other Cases
1. Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation
AI-Haramain Islamic Foundation ("A1-Haramain") was an
organization incorporated in Ashland, Oregon. 46  Al-Haramain was
affiliated with, and supported by, an organization of the same name based
out of Saudi Arabia.147 For years, the United States had tried to shut down
Al-Haramain because of suspected links to al-Qaeda1 48 In February 2004,
OFAC froze Al-Haramain's Oregon assets. 49  Al-Haramain brought suit,
alleging that OFAC had frozen Al-Haramain's assets based on illegal
electronic surveillance. 50 The case is still pending, and the court has yet to
issue a fuller, unclassified factual record.
143 See id. at 42-46 (discussing the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement in
connection with the blocking order).
144 See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 48 (D.D.C.
2005) (citing Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002) for its
entire analysis of the Fourth Amendment).
145 See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzalez, 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming district
court on other grounds).
146 See Complaint at 3, AI-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or.
2006) (No. 06-274-KI) (stating the alleged facts).
147 See id. (stating the alleged facts).
148 See, e.g., Matthew Rosenberg, Associated Press, Al Qaeda Skimming Charity Money, CBS
NEWS, June 7, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/06/07/terror/main621621.shtm (last visited
May 12, 2007) (detailing recent moves by the United States to shut down the organization) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Fact Sheet: Designations of Somalia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina Branches of Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY (Mar.
11, 2002), http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/03/dot03ll02fact.html (announcing blocking of Somali and
Bosnian offices of AI-Haramain) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
149 See AI-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (D. Or. 2006)
(stating the alleged facts).
1" See id. (describing AI-Haramain's claims).
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2. KindHearts
KindHearts was a charity based out of Toledo, Ohio, and had formed
in the aftermath of the GRF and HLF closings. 15  On February 19, 2006,
OFAC blocked its assets, claiming that KindHearts supported Hamas.152 The
charity claimed that it was particularly surprised by OFAC actions because
the Senate Finance Committee had allegedly investigated and recently
cleared KindHearts of any wrongdoing.
153
3. Al-Barakaat
Al-Barakaat was an alternative remittance system that allowed people
across the world to send money to Somalia. 54 The system was fairly similar
to a hawala (an informal financial transmittal network for Muslims), and
allowed Somali emigrants to send money back home despite Somalia's lack
of a formal banking system. 5 5 Prior to 2001, the FBI came to believe that
al-Barakaat had financed terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda. 56 No
actions against al-Barakaat occurred until after 9/11, however, when in
November 2001, OFAC blocked its assets and federal agents raided eight of
its offices around the country. 157  The FBI was unable to build a criminal
case against al-Barakaat because "the transactions themselves revealed
151 See Associated Press, U.S. Blocks Accounts Of Ohio Islamic Charity: KindHearts Tied to
Hamas, Treasury Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2005, at A5, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.conmwp-dyn/content/article/2006/02119/AR2006021900916.htmrl (describing
the charity) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
152 See id. (describing OFAC blocking order); Treasury Freezes Assets of Organization Tied to
Hamas, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY (Feb. 19, 2006), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js4058.htm (last
visited May 12, 2007) (announcing OFAC action).
153 See Statement by KindHearts, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS (Feb. 23, 2006),
available at http://archives2006.ghazali.net/html/anothermuslimcharity.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2008)
("KindHearts had no prior notice to the Government action and was surprised since only a few months
ago the Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Chuck Grassley, Republican from Iowa, had cleared
KindHearts, and 21 other Muslim organizations, from any wrongdoing."). However, a statement by
Grassley in 2005 contradicted this statement: "The fact that the Committee has taken no public action
based on the review of these documents does not mean that these groups have been 'cleared' by the
Committee." Memorandum from Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (Dec. 6, 2005),
available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/press/Gpress/2005/prgl2O6O5a.pdf.
154 See MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 67 (describing al-Barakaat).
155 See id. at 67-69 (describing al-Barakaat).
156 See id. at 70-71 (describing the early FBI investigation).
157 See id. at 80 (describing November raids).
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neither who the recipient of the money was nor what happened to the money
once it arrived."'' 58 No lawsuit was ever brought.
59
IV. Fourth Amendment Analysis
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 160
OFAC blocking actions are probably unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. First, blocking or freezing assets under the IEEPA constitutes a
Fourth Amendment seizure. After laying out the test of a Fourth
Amendment seizure in Part A, this Note applies the rule to the IEEPA
blocking order context in Part B, providing a straightforward application of
Supreme Court precedent to the IEEPA blocking order context, a comparison
to seizures in the securities asset freeze context, and a refutation of courts'
Fourth Amendment analysis in the charity cases. Second, blocking or
freezing assets under the IEEPA constitutes an unreasonable seizure under
the Fourth Amendment, and is therefore unconstitutional. Supreme Court
precedent has, under extremely limited circumstances, allowed for temporary
seizures based upon reasonable suspicion, which is less than probable
cause. 161 As analyzed in Part C.2, however, the blocking orders that OFAC
has issued pursuant to the IEEPA have gone well past the limits provided by
the Supreme Court, and therefore are probably unconstitutional. This section
concludes by suggesting procedures which may be reasonable in this context,
such that the asset freezes comply with the Fourth Amendment.
158 Id. at 69.
159 For a thorough analysis of al-Barakaat and the government investigation into it, see id. at 67-
86.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
161 See infra Part C.I.
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A. What Constitutes a Seizure
The Court has stated that the word "seizure," since the founding of
United States, has meant a "taking possession." 162 At common law, seizure
"connoted not merely grasping, or applying physical force to, the animate or
inanimate object in question, but actually bringing it within physical
control."'163 What constitutes physical control depends "upon the nature of
the thing seized. '' 64  Notably, control can be actual or constructive.
65
Regarding seizures of property under the common law, "a governmental
agent who does not acquire actual physical possession of an item of personal
property might be considered to have dominion and control-constructive
possession-over the item by preventing it from being moved, transported or
accessible to other persons."'166  Of course, while common law seizure in
many ways provides the cornerstone of Fourth Amendment analysis, the
definition of common law seizure is not coterminous with the definition of
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment's
definition of seizure is broader than the common law's definition.
167
Actual control is a fairly straightforward concept, and it should be
clear in most cases where actual control is exercised whether a seizure
occurs. What constitutes constructive control is more problematic. The
Supreme Court has divided its Fourth Amendment seizure analysis into
seizures of the person and seizures of property. 168 The Supreme Court first
defined constructive control within the context of seizures of the person. In
Terry v. Ohio,'69 the Court concluded that "[o]nly when the officer, by means
162 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,624 (1991) (citing dictionaries from 1828 and 1921).
163 Id.
164 Pelham v. Rose, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 103, 106 (1869) ("[B]y the seizure of a thing is meant the
taking of a thing into possession, the manner of which, and whether actual or constructive, depending
upon the nature of the thing seized.").
165 See id. (noting that possession can be actual or constructive); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 703-04 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing actual and constructive
possession).
166 Steven G. Davison, Warrantless Investigative Seizures of Real and Tangible Personal
Property by Law Enforcement Officers, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 577, 594 (1988).
167 See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627 n.3 ("Katz v. United States unequivocally rejects the notion
that the common law of arrest defines the limits of the term 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment ....
What Katz stands for is the proposition that items which could not be subject to seizure at common law
(e.g., telephone conversations) can be seized under the Fourth Amendment.") (citations and quotations
omitted).
168 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708-09 (1983) (comparing of the degree of
intrusion imposed by seizures of the person and seizures of property).
'0 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty
of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." 170 Thus, seizure
of the person in the arrest situation "requires either physical force . . . or,
where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority."'171 The Court's
seizure of property jurisprudence is similar. The Court has defined a seizure
of property as a "meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interest in that property."'' 72  Indeed, the Court specifically linked its
definition of a seizure of property to a seizure of a person. 173 As with the
definition of seizure of the person, the Court's definition of seizure of
property stems from the common law. 
174
The focus of inquiry regarding whether a seizure has occurred is the
restraint on the protected interest, and not the government's actions as such:
[T]he government's actions are only incidental, albeit necessary,
requirements. Seizures of property implicate an individual's possessory
interest in the property. 175 The "meaningful interference" test for seizures of
property thus focuses on the effect of the government's action on the
individual's possessory interest. Therefore, constructive control encapsulates
not the extent of the government's interest in the property but only the extent
of the government's interference with the individual's interest in the
property. Thus, constructive control expresses a negative rather than positive
power. For example, regarding seizures of the person, the Court in
California v. Hodari D.,'7 stated, "The word 'seizure' readily bears the
meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain
movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.'' 177  Thus, when a
policeman lays his hand on an individual, the Court has held that is a seizure.
It is quite obvious that the fact of touching the individual does not
necessarily place the individual within the actual control or dominion of the
policeman. However, a person will not feel free to leave (even though he
170 Id. at 20n.16.
171 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.
172 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
173 See id. at 113 n.5 ("While the concept of a 'seizure' of property is not much discussed in our
cases, this definition follows from our oft-repeated definition of the 'seizure' of a person within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment-meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's
freedom of movement.").
174 See id. at 121 (stating that the assertion of dominion and control over property constitutes a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
175 See id. at 113 ("A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference
with an individual's possessory interests in that property.").
176 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,624 (1991).
177 Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
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might physically be able to), thereby constituting constructive control, and
thus a seizure. Similarly, within the context of seizures of property, the
Court in United States v. Place'78 held the detention of luggage for ninety
minutes constituted a seizure, 179 but the policemen in Place did not have the
authority to perform a search of the luggage. Constructive control thus
expresses a negative power: [T]he power of the government to negate an
individual's interest, either in his own liberty or in his possession of
property.
Therefore, seizures may, and often do, last only temporarily. How
long the seizure lasts may very well go to the meaningfulness of the
interference with the individual's possessory interest, Is° but the mere fact
that a seizure is temporary has no bearing itself upon the analysis. The
Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that temporary meaningful interferences
with property constitute seizures. For example, in Terry v. Ohio, a
temporary frisking of an individual on a street after the initiation of physical
contact by the officer constituted a seizure.' 81 In United States v. Place, a
ninety-minute detention of a traveler's luggage constituted a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 82  Indeed, the Place Court also
assumed temporary seizures constituted cognizable Fourth Amendment
seizures when it analyzed the reasonableness requirement in light of the
length of the seizure. 83 Thus, the length of the interference does not bear on
whether a seizure has occurred. It does not matter how long the meaningful
interference lasts, only whether there is a meaningful interference.
84
178 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
179 See id. at 707 ("There is no doubt that the agents made a 'seizure' of Place's luggage for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. ... ); see also Soldal v. Cook County 506 U.S. 56, 63 (1992)
("[T]aking custody of Place's suitcase was deemed an unlawful seizure for it unreasonably infringed 'the
suspect's possessory interest in his luggage."').
180 Cf id. at 709 ("Although we have recognized the reasonableness of seizures longer than the
momentary ones involved in Terry, Adams, and Brignoni-Ponce, . . . the brevity of the invasion of the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so
minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion.").
181 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) ("It must be recognized that whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.").
182 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 ("There is no doubt that the agents made a 'seizure' of
Place's luggage for purposes of the Fourth Amendment .... ").
183 Id. at 709 ("Although we have recognized the reasonableness of seizures longer than the
momentary ones involved in Terry, Adams, and Brignoni-Ponce, . . . the brevity of the invasion of the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so
minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion.").
184 See also Davison, supra note 166, at 593 ("In reaching [the holding in Jacobsen], the majority.
did not refer to how long a period of time the DEA agents asserted dominion and control . ...
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B. Blocking or Freezing of Assets under the IEEPA as Seizures
1. A Straightforward Constitutional Analysis
A constitutional analysis clearly compels the conclusion that asset
freezes or blockings under the IEEPA of Islamic charities constitute seizures
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The basic test is whether
there has been a "meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interest in that property."'185 Undoubtedly, within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, a charity or organization is protected as a "person." Moreover,
the assets seized in these situations constitute property, and the charities have
interests in the property that can only be described as possessory. The only
question, then, is whether the asset freezes are "meaningful interferences"
with the charities' property. It should be clear that the freezes or blockings
of assets constitute interferences with the charities' possessory interests:
blockings, by their very nature, interfere with the charities' right to transfer
or otherwise use their assets; the assets are truly "frozen."'186 As the assets
are frozen, so must be the charities' interest in them. The Executive thus has
constructive control of the assets.
87
The Place Court considered a mere ninety-minute detention of an
individual's luggage to be a meaningful interference with the individual's
possessory interest in the luggage. 88 Regarding the asset freezes of Islamic
charities, the 9/11 Commission concluded: "IEEPA's provision allowing
blocking 'during the pendency of an investigation' is a powerful weapon
with potentially dangerous applications when applied to domestic
institutions. This provision lets the government shut down an organization..
Consequently, this part of the Jacobsen decision might be interpreted as holding that a seizure occurs
when a government official asserts dominion and control over an item of personal property for even a
brief period of time."); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996) (concluding that temporary
detention of an individual, "even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure'
of 'persons' within the meaning of" the Fourth Amendment).
185 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
186 See supra Part ilI.A.
187 Cf Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2002) (arguing that the
IEEPA "is designed to give the President means to control assets that could be used by enemy aliens")
(emphasis added); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673 (1981) (stating that "the congressional
purpose in authorizing blockings orders [under the TWEA] is 'to put control of foreign assets in the hands
of the President"') (quoting Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 493 (1949)).
'8 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) ("There is no doubt that the agents made a
'seizure' of Place's luggage for purposes of the Fourth Amendment .... ").
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. .,189 Indeed, all of the charities subject to OFAC asset freezes were
effectively shut down by the freezes and ceased to operate even when OFAC
could not bring any actual charges of wrongdoing against the charities.'
90
This is not surprising: Shutting down the charities pending an investigation
is actually the goal of the temporary asset freezes.' 9' If a ninety-minute
detention of an individual's luggage constitutes a meaningful interference,
surely a "temporary" asset freeze, which has no limit on its time duration,
must also constitute a meaningful interference of a possessory interest.
Regarding the charity cases outlined above, the seizures lasted for months, if
not years, while the government investigated possible wrongdoing.
92
Therefore, asset freezes or blockings of Islamic charities clearly constitute
meaningful interferences with the charities' possessory interest in their
property, and are thus seizures within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
2. Asset Freezes in the Securities Context
Using asset freezes to prevent transfer of funds is not confined to the
IEEPA. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has used asset
freezes pending its own investigations of individuals under investigation.' 93
The SEC will take injunctive action-usually through temporary restraining
orders or preliminary injunctions-to ensure that the assets will not
disappear and will be available for remedies at the conclusion of the
enforcement action. 194 Similar to the blocking of assets under the IEEPA, an
189 MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 112 (emphasis added).
190 See supra Part II.
191 Cf. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Response to
Inquiries from Arab American and American Muslim Communities for Guidance on Charitable Best
Practices (Nov. 7 2002), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/po3607.htm (stating that the goal of
freezing assets is "to prevent financial resources from getting into the hands of terrorist organizations")
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
192 This is deduced from the dates of the initial freezing orders of OFAC and dates of the courts'
opinions in the cases.
193 See, e.g., Colello v. SEC, 908 F. Supp. 738 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (analyzing SEC's pursuit of an
injunction freezing individual's assets); SEC v. Healthsouth Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (N.D. Al. 2003)
(analyzing SEC's pursuit of an injunction freezing corporate officer's assets).
194 See Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Introduction to International Law Enforcement-
Asset Freezes, 3F SEC. & FED. CORP. LAW § 27:314 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the SEC's asset freezing
actions and their purposes); J. William Hicks, Freeze of Defendant's Assets, 17 CIVIL LiABtLrrms:
ENFORCEMENT & LITIG., § 2:45 (2006) (describing the SEC's asset freezing actions and their purposes).
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SEC "freeze order is [intended to be] a temporary remedy that seeks to
preserve the status quo while other determinations are made." 1
95
One court held that the freezing of assets by the SEC are seizures
under the Fourth Amendment. 96  In Colello v. S.E.C.,197 the Swiss
government, at the request of the SEC, froze the Swiss assets of an individual
who was under investigation by the SEC. 198 Under a treaty between the
United States and Switzerland, the freezing could take place based upon
reasonable suspicion, a standard less exacting than probable cause. 199 In
analyzing whether the freeze constituted a seizure, the court cited the
"meaningful interference" test and concluded that the freeze constituted a
seizure.2°° It is noteworthy that the government did not dispute that the asset
freeze was a seizure: "Both the [Securities and Exchange] Commission and
[the Department of] Justice agree that the asset freeze was in fact a
'seizure.'' 201 Any theoretical or practical difference between asset freezes in
the SEC enforcement context and asset freezes in the IEEPA enforcement
context are, at best, allusive and illusive.
3. Rebutting the IEEPA Case Law on the Fourth Amendment
Provided this context, the courts' holdings concerning the Fourth
Amendment in the charity cases are not only astonishing, but astounding.
The district court's analysis in Holy Land Foundation20 2 is the leading
judicial opinion on the topic. The only other case to analyze asset freezes
under the IEEPA in the Islamic charity context is Islamic American Relief
Agency,2°3 but that court's analysis rested entirely on Holy Land
Foundation's analysis.
The district court in Holy Land Foundation first made a congressional
authority argument.20 4  The government argued, and the district court
195 Hicks, supra note 194, § 2:45.
'96 See Colello, 908 F. Supp. at 755 (holding that an SEC-initiated asset freeze violated a
corporate officer's Fourth Amendment rights).
197 Colello v. SEC, 908 F. Supp. 738 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
198 Id. at 742 (describing the factual background).
199 Id. at 744 (describing the treaty).
'00 Id. at 753, 755 (citing Jacobsen and holding the freeze to be a seizure).
201 Id. The government instead argued that the seizure was reasonable. See id. ("The Government
argues that the seizure was reasonable and therefore not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.").
202 Holy Land Found. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002).
2o3 Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002).
2o4 See Holy Land Found, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (arguing that the IEEPA authorized OFAC to
block HLF's property).
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concluded, that the "Government plainly had the authority to issue the
blocking order pursuant to the JEEPA and the Executive Orders .... The
government made this same type of argument in Global Relief
Foundation,2 °6 arguing that the statutory language and legislative history
differentiated between "blocking" and "seizing" property:
Although [GRF] claims the legislative history shows that the
President cannot seize records under IEEPA, the statutory language
makes it clear that Congress explicitly allowed for the unrelated act
of freezing or blocking records. In any event, the legislative history
[of the IEEPA] demonstrates the difference between "blocking" and
"seizing" property; Congress considered a "seizure" to be equivalent
to a "vesting" or "forfeiture" of the property, with ownership passing
to the government, while a "blocking" merely permitted the agency
to hold or "freeze" the property, but not take title to it .... For these
same reasons, Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim against OFAC
should be rejected as well.
20 7
For purposes of this Note, it is not disputed that the statutory language and
legislative history of the IEEPA differentiate between "blocking" and
"seizing" property. Regardless, that is irrelevant to the constitutional
analysis: Congress cannot abrogate the Fourth Amendment through
208legislation. Nor does Congress have final authority to define
constitutional terms such as seizure.2°  Congressional intent is therefore
useful in determining the extent of OFAC's authority under the IEEPA, but it
has no bearing in determining whether OFAC's actions square with the
210Constitution.
205 Id.
206 Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 205 F. Supp. 2d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
207 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment, supra note 66, at 16 n. 19 (citations
omitted).
208 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178-80 (1803) ("So if a law be in opposition to the
constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either
decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution,
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case .... [A]
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.").
209 Cf id. at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.").
210 Id. In this light, the government makes a compelling argument that OFAC has the authority to
freeze or block assets, but it has no authority to vest assets through forfeiture.
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The court in Holy Land Foundation also relied on case law for its
conclusion that blockings do not constitute seizures.2 1  The court first cited
Tran Qui Than v. Regan,212 which argued, "[t]he blocking of the assets
[under the TWEA] .. .does not affect the interest, right or title to them
which [the owner] may possess. The blocking action merely suspends
indefinitely the right to transfer those funds., 213  Later in the opinion,
however, the Tran court stated that "blocking involves a deprivation of the
enjoyment of a property interest. ''214  As it turns out, neither of these
seemingly contradictory statements is particularly relevant to Fourth
Amendment seizure analysis. The first statement is in a section of the
opinion analyzing whether the plaintiff is a member of the designated class
that has a cause of action under the TWEA.21 5  Such an analysis obviously
has little to do with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The second statement
is in a section analyzing whether the blocking constitutes a taking under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 216 The constitutional analyses for
Fourth Amendment seizures and Fifth Amendment takings, however, are
different and distinct.21 7  Perhaps the most important difference between the
two analyses for this Note's purpose is that under the Fifth Amendment the
property must vest in the government,21 8 but under the Fourth Amendment
211 See Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 78-79 (D.D.C.
2002) ("Further, the case law is clear that a blocking of this nature does not constitute a seizure.").
2' 658 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1981).
213 Id. at 1301 (citation omitted).
214 Id. at 1304.
215 See id. at 1300-01. The Tran court stated:
The district court reviewed the action of the Secretary, acting through the office of
Foreign Assets Control, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. Than contends that this was in error. He asserts that the
Secretary's decision should have been reviewed under § 9(a) of the TWEA, 50
U.S.C.App. § 9(a). Than's assertion is incorrect. Section 9(a) of the [TWEA]
authorizes '[a]ny person not an enemy or ally of enemy claiming any interest, right,
or title in any money or other property which may have been conveyed, transferred,
assigned, delivered or paid to the [United States Government] or seized by [it]' to
seek return of the property through an administrative proceeding or through a suit in
federal district court.
Id. (emphasis added).
216 See id. at 1304 (analyzing a takings claim).
217 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (concluding that a seizure of
property occurs when there is a "meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that
property"); Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296, 1304 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing the requirement that
vesting occur for there to be a taking).
218 See, e.g., Tran, 658 F.2d at 1304 ("describing the difference between blocking and vesting).
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seizures can be temporary. 219 Specifically, in cases raising takings claims
under the TWEA or LEEPA, courts often have held that blocking orders do
not constitute vesting because they are temporary. 2 0 As argued above
though, seizures under the Fourth Amendment can be temporary. Therefore,
whether a Fifth Amendment taking occurs is irrelevant to whether a Fourth
Amendment seizure occurs. Thus, Tran does not provide any support for the
Holy Land Foundation court's Fourth Amendment analysis because Tran
does not discuss the Fourth Amendment at all.
Three of the other four cases the Holy Land Foundation court cites
also do not discuss the Fourth Amendment, but instead discuss the Takings
Clause.221 Because they do not present any different analysis than Tran, they
will not be repeated here. The final case cited by the court in Holy Land
Foundation is Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empleados de Distribuidores de
Drogas v. Newcomb,222 an unreported case, and, as it turns out, an irrelevant
one. That case stands for the basic proposition that blocking does not
223constitute a forfeiture. Seizures under the Fourth Amendment, however,
involve any "meaningful interference" with an individual's possessory
interest in property-the interference clearly need not amount to a forfeiture
to satisfy this test.224 In short, none of the cases cited in Holy Land
Foundation lead to the conclusion, let alone support the idea, that asset
freezes under the IEEPA constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
The courts' analyses in these cases have been simply wrong.
219 See supra Part lI.B.1.
220 See, e.g., Tran, 658 F.2d at 1304 ("We recognize that blocking involves a deprivation of the
enjoyment of a property interest. That deprivation is temporary, however, and is not equivalent to vesting.
Vesting occurs when title to assets is transferred to the government; blocking does not transfer title but
rather prohibits temporarily, transactions involving those assets.").
221 See D.C. Precision Inc. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 2d 338, 343 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
("However, to the extent that D.C. Precision plans to pursue a taking claim, the court holds that the claim
is meritless. Assets blocked under the Executive Orders are not seized or appropriated by the government.
Rather, blocking temporarily prohibits transactions involving those assets."); IPT Co. v. U.S. Dept. of
Treasury, 1994 WL 613371, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("This Court holds that defendant's blocking is not
a taking as title to the property has not vested in the Government."); Can v. United States, 820 F. Supp.
106, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Than for the argument that because a blocking order is temporary, it is
not equivalent to a vesting).
222 Cooperativa Multiactiva de Empleados de Distribuidores de Drogas v. Newcomb, No. 98-
0949 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 1999).
223 See id. at 13-14 (arguing that blocking does not constitute a forfeiture).
224 Cf, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that detention (i.e. not
forfeiture) of a piece of luggage for ninety minutes constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment).
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C. The Reasonableness of the Asset Freezes
1. The Constitutional Framework
The Fourth Amendment states, "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures," and, "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. 225 The
Supreme Court has interpreted these clauses to mean that, in the "ordinary
case," "a seizure of personal property [is] per se unreasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a
judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the
items to be seized., 226 Warrants are generally required because they ensure
that searches and seizures are reasonable.227 While the warrant requirement
is the general rule, "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. '" 228  The
Court, therefore, has carved out limited exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Exceptions to the warrant requirement are permissible "if the
exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized
exception to the warrant requirement is present. '" 229 Exigent circumstances
may exist when there are "special law enforcement needs, diminished
expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like., 230  In most such
exceptions, probable cause is still required.231
The Court, however, has also carved out exceptions, based upon
exigent circumstances, to the probable cause requirement that allow for
searches based only on "reasonable suspicion." The main case allowing
reasonable suspicion to be the standard is Terry v. Ohio, which held that
temporary seizures of the person in a stop and frisk situation on the street
225 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
226 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983).
227 See Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) ("The warrant
procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable
governmental interest.").
228 id.
229 Place, 462 U.S. at 701 (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)).
230 Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001).
231 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3 (1984) ("[1It is
clear that such an arrest or search is unreasonable if not based upon probable cause."); c Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987) ("Dispensing with the need for a warrant is worlds apart from permitting
a lesser standard of cause for the seizure than a warrant would require, i.e., the standard of probable
cause.").
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could be based on only reasonable suspicion.232 The Court set out a
balancing test, weighing the government's interest against the
constitutionally protected interest of the individual.233 If the balance
weighed in the government's favor, the government must have reasonable
suspicion, which the court defined: "[I]n justifying the particular intrusion
the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion. ,234 Regarding the facts at hand, the Court determined
the exigent circumstances of the case-that officers on the beat often need to
act quickly-which historically had not, and practically could not, be
"subjected to the warrant procedure," weighed in favor of the reasonableness
of the intrusion.235  The Court cautioned, however, that "whenever
practicable, [police must] obtain advance judicial approval of searches and
seizures through the warrant procedure. '236 Thus, the Terry exception was
limited to narrow circumstances.
The Supreme Court expanded the Terry exception regarding
temporary seizures of the person to temporary seizures of property in United
States v. Place.237 As the Place Court stated the balancing test:
We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the government interests alleged to justify the intrusion. When the
nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law
enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less than
probable cause. 38
Regarding the government's interests in the case, the court concluded the
public had a "compelling interest" in detecting drug traffickers and that,
because "of the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at
232 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (concluding that only reasonable suspicion is
necessary in such circumstances).
233 See id. at 20-21 (describing the balancing test).
234 Id. at 21.
235 Id. at 20.
236 Id.
237 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (extending the principles of Terry to a
situation in which luggage was detained for ninety minutes).
238 Id. at 703.
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airports, ''239 the police's interest in temporarily detaining luggage was
"substantial., 240  The Court has elsewhere considered the seriousness of the
offense in determining whether the government's interest is substantial.
24'
Regarding the extent of the individual's interest, the court concluded:
[T]he brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is
so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion.
Moreover, in assessing the effect of the length of the detention, we
take into account whether the police diligently pursue their
investigation.
242
The Court declined to set a time limit on such seizures, preferring instead to
"allow authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any
particular situation. '243 The Court concluded that, on the facts before it, the
ninety minute detention was unreasonable because of the length of the
detention and the lack of due diligence of the police in pursuing the
investigation.244 As a whole, then, under the balancing test the Court looks
to the totality of the circumstances 245 and engages in a fact-specific
inquiry.246
2. What Reasonableness Requires for IEEPA Blocking Orders
Under the IEEPA, OFAC can block the assets of an organization
during the pendency of an investigation without a warrant, probable cause, or
239 Id. at 704-05.
240 See id. (discussing the degree of governmental interest in allowing police to search subjects at
airports without probable cause).
241 See Recent Cases, Tenth Circuit Applies Reasonable Suspicion Standard to Stops for Minor
Traffic Infractions: United States v. Callarman, 116 HARV. L. REv. 697, 702 (2002) (citations omitted)
("Court precedent makes clear that the government interest varies with the seriousness of the suspected
offense and implies that such interest may be sufficiently substantial to justify a departure from the
probable cause requirement ... ").
242 Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
243 Id. at 710.
244 See id. (concluding that the seizure was unreasonable under the circumstances).
245 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (noting the Court's general Fourth
Amendment analysis as engaging in a totality of the circumstances approach).
246 See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) ("In applying this test [of reasonableness] we
have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the
reasonableness inquiry.").
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247reasonable suspicion. Because there is no current standard for blocking
assets pursuant to the IEEPA, the current procedure is patently
unconstitutional. To comply with constitutional demands, OFAC will likely
have to initially base its blocking order on at least reasonable suspicion.
While the Supreme Court might not require probable cause and/or a warrant
to initially block the assets in question, at the very least a warrant will need
to be sought and issued within a narrow time frame to keep the blocking
order in place.
To dispense with the warrant requirement, exigent circumstances need
248to be present.2 8 There are two possible ways exigent circumstances could be
applied in the context of freezing orders under the LEEPA: first, the broad
power of the President over national security and foreign affairs might create
exigent circumstances such that reasonable suspicion can justify all blocking
orders under the IEEPA; second, exigent circumstances might exist if there is
specific evidence that there is an immediate possibility that the funds might
vanish or be dispersed to terrorist groups. That is, the first possibility posits
that in the IEEPA context, exigent circumstances always exist, and the
second possibility posits that exigent circumstances only exist if an
immediate danger can be shown.
Using the balancing test of Place,249 exigent circumstances should not
always, per se, exist for IEEPA blocking orders. The President's foreign
affairs and national security powers provide the basis that exigent
circumstances would always exist for IEEPA blocking orders. As the
government argued in Islamic American Relief Agency, "IEEPA blocking
occurs only in circumstances of an 'unusual and extraordinary threat . . . to
the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States,' with
respect to which the President has formally declared a 'national
emergency.' , 250  It is undeniable that blocking orders under the IEEPA
247 Cf. International Economic Emergency Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101, 91 Stat. 1625
(1997) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2004)) (authorizing the President to "block
during the pendency of an investigation" assets of suspected parties, but providing no standard of
evidence upon which to base those actions).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (permitting warrantless temporary
seizures if "the exigencies of the circumstances" so demand).
249 See id. at 703 ("We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion.").
m Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, Islamic Am. Relief Agency v.
Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34,42 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1977)).
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implicate the President's national security powers, 25 and that such powers
provide compelling government interests.252 Furthermore, courts generally
defer to the government's assessment of national security and foreign policy
issues, such that if the government can make the claim that exigent
circumstances always inhere in the IEEPA context, the courts should be
253deferential to that analysis.
That said, such a compelling interest probably does not by itself create
exigent circumstances that justify departing from the warrant requirement or
probable cause. FISA presents a useful comparison. Under FISA, if the
government wants to obtain a wiretap for electronic surveillance it must go
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") to establish probable
cause and obtain a warrant.254 First, under FISA, the same compelling
governmental interests are present as with IEEPA blocking orders; probable
cause, and not reasonable suspicion, is still required.255 On this basis,
blocking orders under the IEEPA should be subject to similar constraints.
Second, FISA was amended to give the FISC jurisdiction over physical
search requests as well.256 Indeed, in Global Relief Fund, the government
actually used FISA warrants to search the charity's offices.257 This directly
contradicts the idea that exigent circumstances are present in the terrorist
financing context: [It makes little sense for the President's national security
powers to create carte blanche for warrantless asset freezes but for the same
powers in the same exact context not to create carte blanche for warrantless
physical searches and wiretaps. Third, FISA allows emergency warrantless
searches to occur, provided the government seeks a warrant within seventy-
two hours of the search. 258 The point is that probable cause and warrants are
the general rule under FISA. Thus, the probable cause requirements of FISA
belie any notion that exigent circumstances are inherent in presidential
authority over foreign affairs in the IEEPA context. Rather, the seventy-two
251 Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (analyzing the President's powers under
the TWEA and IEEPA).
252 Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (stating that executive action taken pursuant to the President's inherent authority and
authorization from Congress create a strong presumption of legitimacy).
253 Cf. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) ("Matters related to foreign policy and national
security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.").
2m See 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2006) (providing guidelines for obtaining a warrant for electronic
surveillance of foreign intelligence).
255 Id.
256 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a).
257 See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 205 F. Supp. 2d 885, 886 (N.D. 111. 2002)
(discussing the factual background of the case).
258 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f).
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hour exception in FISA supports the conclusion that exigent circumstances
only exist when there is a specific emergency, and do not always, per se,
exist in the foreign affairs context.
The compelling governmental interest of national security also does
not inherently present the same immediacy and danger concerns that are
present in Supreme Court precedent. Terry v. Ohio allowed reasonable
suspicion because of the need for officer safety and quick decision-making
while on the beat,259 and United States v. Place allowed reasonable suspicion
because of the highly mobile nature of drug trafficking at airports.260 Federal
circuit courts have also held warrantless searches under the TWEA to be
constitutional, but these opinions stressed the urgent situation of World War
II and, importantly, applied to foreign entities, not domestic organizations.261
On the other hand, there is nothing inherent in running a front organization
for terrorist financing that creates such a need for immediacy in blocking
assets. Indeed, it makes sense that such organizations would want to appear
to be as much like regular charities as possible, and not turn around its assets
as soon as they come in.
Finally, the government argued in Islamic American Relief Agency that
courts have upheld the President's inherent authority to conduct foreign
surveillance and intelligence without a warrant.262 The cases the government
cites concern foreign intelligence gathering, however, and not criminal
investigations of citizens and domestic organizations.263 The primary
259 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("But we deal here with an entire rubric of police
conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat-which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant
procedure.") (emphasis added).
260 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983) ("The context of a particular law
enforcement practice, of course, may affect the determination whether a brief intrusion on Fourth
Amendment interests on less than probable cause is essential to effective criminal investigation."). The
Court went on to state: "[b]ecause of the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at airports,
allowing police to make brief investigative stops of persons at airports on reasonable suspicion of drug-
trafficking substantially enhances the likelihood that police will be able to prevent the flow of narcotics
into distribution channels." Id.
261 See, e.g., Now v. United States, 148 F.2d 696, 698-99 (5th Cir. 1945) ("With such searches in
the sudden emergency of war necessary to be made throughout the country will all the speed and
efficiency, under the urgent orders of the President and Secretary of the Treasury, we hold the search and
seizure, though without a warrant, was not unreasonable ... ").
262 See Islamic Am. ReliefAgency, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 44. (analyzing searches and seizures).
263 See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980) ("Few, if any,
district courts would be truly competent to judge the importance of particular information to the security
of the United States or the 'probable cause' to demonstrate that the government in fact needs to recover
that information from one particular source.").
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distinction is that in foreign intelligence surveillance operations, courts are
not competent to determine whether probable cause exists, but in criminal
cases, determination of probable cause is standard issue.26  Indeed, the
blocking orders are issued under the IEEPA "during the pendency of an
investigation.' 265  The investigation at issue is examining whether the
organization is providing material support to terrorist groups, with the goal
of bringing criminal charges against the organization.266  Courts are surely
competent to assess the basis of a blocking order under probable cause
because courts must assess and preside over a criminal trial of the same
evidence and the same crime. The foreign intelligence exception is therefore
incongruous and inapplicable to IEEPA blocking orders.
On the other hand, an organization's interest in the use of its assets is
compelling. Blocking or freezing an organization's assets is a severe
intrusion upon the organization. Blocking assets effectively shuts down the
organization while the blocking order is in place.267 Of all the organizations
on which OFAC has placed blocking orders, none has recovered or
continued in existence.26 It is hard to imagine a more profound or severe
effect on an organization than what a blocking order imposes. Furthermore,
the blocking orders that OFAC has issued to date contradict Place's
emphasis on the need for the intrusion to be "brief' and "limited. '269 The
264 See id. at 915 ("[A]s the district court ruled, the executive should be excused from securing a
warrant only when the surveillance is conducted 'primarily' for foreign intelligence reasons."). The court
continued:
We think that the district court adopted the proper test, because once surveillance
becomes primarily a criminal investigation, the courts are entirely competent to
make the usual probable cause determination, and because, importantly,
individual privacy interests come to the fore and government foreign policy
concerns recede when the government is primarily attempting to form the basis
for a criminal prosecution. We thus reject the government's assertion that, if
surveillance is to any degree directed at gathering foreign intelligence, the
executive may ignore the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
ld.
265 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2000) (emphasis added).
266 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000) (making it unlawful to give material support to terrorist
entities).
267 See MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 112 (IEEPA's provision allowing blocking 'during the
pendency of an investigation' is a powerful weapon with potentially dangerous applications when applied
to domestic institutions. This provision lets the government shut down an organization without any formal
determination of wrongdoing.").
268 See supra Part fl (analyzing the charity cases).
269 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983) (describing the balancing test).
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duration of the interference is critical to the analysis. 270  In Place, the
Supreme Court held that a ninety-minute seizure was too long and severe an
interference to be allowable on reasonable suspicion.271 In contrast, the
blocking orders that OFAC has issued to date have lasted for months and
years.272 Such blocking orders hardly can be said to be "minimally
intrusive., 273  Thus, balancing the organization's interest with the
government's generalized interest in national security, it seems clear that
exigent circumstances do not inhere in the IEEPA context, and, thus,
probable cause and a warrant must be the general rule.
Because determining whether reasonable suspicion is constitutionally
adequate requires a balancing test based on the totality of the evidence 274 and
the facts of the individual case,275 exigent circumstances might exist in some
cases such that IEEPA blocking orders could be issued upon only reasonable
suspicion. The Supreme Court in both Terry and Place stressed the
immediacy of the situation in its analysis: Terry allowed reasonable
suspicion because of the need for officer safety and quick decision-making
while on the beat,276 and Place allowed reasonable suspicion because of the
highly mobile nature of drug trafficking at airports.277 If the government has
"specific and articulable ',278 evidence that immediate action is necessary-
such as evidence that the organization is about to turn over its assets to
terrorists or otherwise make the assets untraceable-these exigent
270 See id. at 709 ("Mhe brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is
an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on
reasonable suspicion.").
271 See id. ("The length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone precludes the conclusion
that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause.").
272 See supra note 191 (determining the duration of the blocking order from the dates of the initial
freezing order and the dates of the courts' opinions in the cases).
273 Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
274 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (noting the Court's general Fourth
Amendment analysis as engaging in a totality of the circumstances approach).
275 See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) ("In applying this test [of reasonableness] we
have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the
reasonableness inquiry.").
276 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("But we deal here with an entire rubric of police
conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat-which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant
procedure.") (emphasis added).
277 See Place, 462 U.S. at 704 (discussing the "inherently transient nature" of drug trafficking and
its effect on the probable cause requirement for a "brief intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests").
278 See id. at 703 ("[W]here the authorities possess specific and articulable facts warranting a
reasonable belief that a traveler's luggage contains narcotics, the governmental interest in seizing the
luggage briefly to pursue further investigation is substantial.").
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circumstances are likely to justify blocking the organization's assets based
upon reasonable suspicion. In these situations, the government's interests
are paramount.
The organizations' interests in the use of their property, however, also
are compelling. Whether a blocking order based only on reasonable
suspicion will be reasonable-and thus constitutional-will depend upon the
length of the blocking order. Terry stops are quick affairs, lasting only a few
minutes, 279 and the Court in Place held that a ninety-minute seizure was too
long based on the facts of the case.28° It is arguable, however, that national
security interests are simply more compelling than standard criminal law
enforcement interests.
Perhaps the most useful basis to gauge the reasonableness of seizures
is to compare IEEPA blocking orders to emergency searches and wiretaps
taken under FISA, insofar as the Supreme Court has not placed any limits on
the length of time seizures can be based upon reasonable suspicion and still
be held reasonable. Under FISA, the government can forego a warrant in
emergency situations, but must apply for one with the FISC within seventy-
two hours of the warrantless search.281 In emergency situations, allowing
warrantless blocking orders based upon reasonable suspicion to last up to
three days would correlate well with seizures, as the context is much the
same.
282
Furthermore, the government used a FISA warrant when it searched
GRF's offices.2 83 If the government can obtain probable cause to search an
organization's offices, it should be able to use the same evidence to support
probable cause to freeze the organization's assets. As a practical matter, the
government likely will want to block the organization's assets and search its
offices at the same time because if OFAC has notified an organization that its
assets have been frozen, the organization, if actually committing a crime,
might attempt to destroy evidence in its offices. Indeed, the government has
done exactly this: [F]or example, the government blocked GRF's and BIF's
279 See id. at 709 n.10 (citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(1)
(1975)) (suggesting Terry stops be limited to twenty minutes).
280 See id. at 710 (holding that the seizure was impermissible based on the facts of the case).
23 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (Supp. IV 2000) (authorizing emergency employment of electronic
surveillance with an application for a warrant within 72 hours).
282 The time limit for asset freezes upon less than probable cause likely would have to be less than
three days, however, because the individual's interest in using his assets is much greater than his interest
in privacy to be free from wiretaps; the balancing test would favor heavily a shorter time span for asset
freezes.
283 See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 205 F. Supp. 2d 885, 886 (N.D. i. 2002)
(discussing the factual background of the case).
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assets on December 14, 2001, and conducted raids of both charities' offices
the same day.284 In fact, the FBI had not planned to raid BIF's domestic
offices, but decided to do so at the last minute because "FBI personnel
learned that some of the targets of the investigations may be destroying
documents.'285 This is likely to occur, if for no other reason, because OFAC
cannot seem to prevent press leaks that tip organizations and news media of
the impending actions. 286 If the government is likely to coordinate its
measures, such that asset freezes occur at the same time as physical searches,
it is fanciful that the two actions should be allowed based on different and
incongruent standards of proof.
In sum, OFAC's blocking orders to date have been unconstitutional
because there have been no formal findings of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. If reasonable suspicion is a permissible standard, due to exigent
circumstances in the IEEPA context, the length of the blocking orders would
have to be strictly limited. While under FISA the permissible time limit is
three days in emergencies, the time limit would have to be shorter for IEEPA
blocking orders. Balancing the interests at stake, the severity of the
interference is much greater in the blocking order context than the
interference of wiretaps under FISA, even though the government's interest
is much the same. This Note therefore recommends that no longer than
twenty-four hours pass between the initial blocking order based upon
reasonable suspicion and a warrant obtained on the basis of probable
cause. 287 Such a procedure should present little difficulty for the government
to carry out its interests because probable cause is needed for the physical
searches of the charities' offices and the government will likely want these
actions to occur concurrently.
284 See MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 99-100 (describing OFAC's blocking orders and the FBI's
raids on the two charities).
285 Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
286 See id. at 100 n.90 ("Press leaks plagued almost every OFAC blocking action that took place in
the United States. The process had extremely poor operational security. In a number of instances, agents
arrived at locations to execute blocking orders and seize businesses only to find television news camera
crews waiting for them.").
287 The 9/11 Commission came to a similar conclusion: "[S]erious consideration should be given
to placing a strict and short limit on the duration of such a temporary blocking. A 'temporary' designation
lasting 10 or 11 months, as in the BIF and GRF cases, becomes hard to justify." MONOGRAPH, supra note
6, at 112.
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V. Conclusion
Investigating and destroying financial networks that fund terrorist
groups is a necessary front in the "War on Terror." This is no easy task,
however. As has been demonstrated in the charity cases discussed above, the
government has been able to gather much evidence linking these groups to
terrorist entities, but has been unable to collect evidence tying the charities'
funds directly to terrorists. 288  The money trail in such cases can be
incredibly difficult to trace, making a criminal case next to impossible.289
Since 9/11, Congress has given the President tools to combat the
inherent problem of tackling terrorist financing. Specifically, Congress
amended the IEEPA in the USA PATRIOT Act to allow the President to
"block during the pendency of an investigation" the assets of designated
terrorists. 29° As the 9/11 Commission stated, this grant of authority was
meant to be a "powerful weapon" to destroy terrorist financing networks.29'
The powerful nature of this weapon, along with problems of gathering
evidence, necessitates that blocking actions against individuals and
organizations proceed with caution and in accordance with constitutional
requirements. Thus far, OFAC has failed to meet the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment in its blocking actions.
It is important that OFAC rectify its procedures to comply with
constitutional demands. As demonstrated in Part II, the charities that have
been subject to blocking orders to date had very troubling links to designated
terrorist organizations. While it must indeed be incredibly frustrating for the
government to know that something is not quite right with an organization,
mere links to terrorists do not constitute a crime. Probable cause must, in the
usual case, be surmounted to block an individual's or an organization's
assets pending an investigation of criminal conduct.
To require probable cause in all but the most extreme circumstances is
not only good jurisprudence, but also good policy. Probable cause prevents
executive discretion that could be used arbitrarily and capriciously to harm
the civil liberties of individuals and groups: Probable cause provides the
accountability that helps sustain our democracy. With few, if any,
'u See MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 110-11 (discussing the evidence linking BIF and GRF to
terrorist groups, but noting that little evidence has been uncovered of the charities' funds actually going to
terrorists).
289 Id.
m 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2000).
29 MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 112.
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procedural safeguards, the blocking action authority under the IEEPA as it
currently stands may allow "the President to selectively blacklist disfavored
political groups. 292 Standardless discretion raises the same fears as the early
Cold War era: "[G]enerating official lists of proscribed organizations
without clear substantive guidelines or meaningful procedural safeguards."
293
It should be remembered that "the total political will, prosecutorial and
investigative talent, and resources of the U.S. government have so far failed
294to secure a single terrorist-related conviction" under the current regime.
The answer to this problem is not to discard cherished constitutional
safeguards, but to find new legal and constitutional ways to unearth terrorist
financing. In the meantime, it would do the judiciary good not to sacrifice
civil liberties in the name of national security. "The struggle to establish
civil liberties against the backdrop of these security threats, while difficult,
promises to build bulwarks of liberty that can endure the fears and frenzy of
sudden danger-bulwarks to help guarantee that a nation fighting for its
survival does not sacrifice those national values that make the fight
worthwhile." 295 The government has shut down six charities without any
formal determination of wrongdoing. That is simply unacceptable.
292 David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 27 (2003).
293 id.
294 MONOGRAPH, supra note 6, at 13.
295 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of
Security Crises, Speech at the Law School of Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel (Dec. 22, 1987).

